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ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD REVEALS THAT MR. HOLLEN'S APPOINTED TRIAL 
COUNSEL COMPLETELY FAILED TO HAVE THE TRIAL COURT, AS 
THE ARBITER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ADMISSIBILITY OF 
IDENTIFICATION, PRELIMINARILY TEST AND DETERMINE THE 
RELIABILITY OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AS A 
MATTER OF DUE PROCESS. 
The State argues that Mr. Hollen's appointed trial counsel made 
a "carefully considered decision" not to file a Ramirez motion. See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 11. Not only does a review of the record 
contradict the State's argument, it proves that Mr. Hollen's 
appointed trial counsel completely failed to have the trial court 
preliminarily test and determine the constitutional reliability of 
the eyewitness identifications upon which the State's case solely 
relied. 
Notwithstanding the State's effort to minimize the problems with 
the eyewitness identifications in the instant case, the record 
reveals numerous glaring problems that call into serious question the 
reliability of the eyewitness identifications. See State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 
493 (Utah 1986)). First, all of the witnesses had a limited 
opportunity to view the robber and a limited degree of attention 
during the event. See R. 156-57, Transcript of Trial (Vol. II) (Mark 
Mudrow testified that he had a total of "thirty seconds maybe" to 
view the robber with the bandage, and that "[t]he whole time he had 
4 
me facing away")/x see id. at R. 171-72 (Mark Mudrow testified that 
it was a dim lighted theater); see id. at R. 180, 184 lines 13-16 
(Heidi Maroney testified that she had only a matter of seconds to 
view the robber with the bandage, that it was ''pretty dark . . . not 
well lit," and that she was "[f]acing the wall the entire time"); see 
id. at R. 202, lines 20-24, R. 217-18 (Megan Brimhall testified that 
she had u [m] aybe four or five seconds" to view the robber, after 
which she admitted that she initially told the investigating 
detective that she had been "looking away from the Hispanic-looking 
suspect" (i.e., the robber with the bandage); see id. at R. 232-33 
(Nathan Nance testified that he u[w]asn't aware of the other 
[robber]", i.e., the robber with bandage on his face); see id. at R. 
249, lines 1-6 (Nicole George testified that she viewed the robbei 
for less than a minute). Moreover, the State in its brief neglects 
to mention that the robbery was completed quickly and at least one 
half of the robber's face was obstructed with a large bandage. See 
id. at R. 162, lines 21-24; R. 163, lines 13-42.2 
xIn addition to the limited opportunity and attention to view the 
robber, Mark Mudrow testified at trial that on the night of the 
robbery he was not wearing his glasses that he utilizes to correct 
his nearsightedness. See R. 164-65, Transcript of Trial (Vol. II). 
2In footnote 2 of its brief, the State cites Common wealth v. 
Levia, 431 N.E.2d 928, 933 (Mass. 1982), in the course of attempting 
to justify appointed trial counsel's failure to have the trial court 
determine the constitutional reliability of the eyewitness 
identifications. The State argues that there are valid reasons for 
not moving to suppress a weaker identification when there are 
multiple identifications. Not only is Levia factually inapplicable 
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The State also conveniently omits from its analysis the fact 
that there was approximately a four-month lapse of time between the 
robbery and the time when Mr. Hollen became a suspect. Id. at R. 
101; R. 116, lines 14-19 (testimony that the information received 
about Mr. Hollen was the third time Police received information 
concerning possible suspects of the robbery). Prior to Mr. Hollen 
becoming a suspect, two of the eyewitnesses who testified at Mr. 
Hollen's trial had identified another individual by the name of 
Michael Cantu from a photo lineup as the robber with the bandage on 
his face. See id. at R. 106-07; R. 108, lines 16-20. In fact, when 
Heidi Maroney was shown the photographs of Mr. Cantu, she "backed up 
a step and put her hand to her mouth" and began shaking. Id. at R. 
107, lines 9-15. She then stated, "That looks like him." Id. at R. 
107, lines 15-16. 
Further, the circumstances under which the robbery was observed 
create a low likelihood that the eyewitnesses would later perceive, 
remember, and relate the event correctly. See, e.g., id. at R. 164, 
lines 12-13 (Mark Mudrow testified that he was "frightened"); see id. 
at R. 181, line 4, R. 184, lines 10-12, R. 184, lines 14-17 (Heidi 
Maroney testified, "I was scared to death . . . extremely scared . . 
inasmuch as all of the of the identifications in the instant case are 
constitutionally weak, but Levia, as a matter of law, is inapplicable 
because it is a "pre-Strickland case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Finally, this supposed 
trial strategy was not in any way articulated by appointed trial 
counsel at the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing before the trial court. 
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. nervous and scared, crying and -- . . . upset . . . unstable"); see 
id. at R. 247, lines 5-8 (Nicole George testified that the robber was 
pointing a gun around at "all of us"); see id. at R. 249, lines 19-20 
(Nicole George testified, "I was scared"). Moreover, the 
unreliability of the eyewitness identifications is further 
exacerbated by the fact that some of the eyewitnesses were making 
what they initially thought was a cross-racial identification. Id. 
at R. 216, lines 5-18; R. 103, lines 7-11; R. 192-93. The low 
likelihood that the eyewitnesses perceived, remembered, and related 
the event correctly is further buttressed by both the previously 
discussed passage of time between the robbery and when Mr. Hollen 
became a suspect and by the apparent inaccurate or false 
identifications of Mr. Cantu by the eyewitnesses a short time after 
the robbery.3 
Perhaps most important, is the fact that the eyewitness 
identifications at trial were seriously tainted by the witnesses' 
exposure to Mr. Hollen at the Preliminary Hearing, where the 
witnesses viewed Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant in the course of 
their appearance as suspects while they were in custody, wearing 
handcuffs and jail clothing. See id. at R. 85, lines 19-21. 
3The reliability of the eyewitness identifications is further 
eroded by the fact that the eyewitnesses identified a bandage and 
medical tape found at the residence of another separate and distinct 
suspect as being "identical" to that utilized in the robbery in the 
instant case. See R. 128-29, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I). 
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Notwithstanding the knowledge of the tainted eyewitness 
identifications, Mr. Hollen's appointed trial counsel made no effort, 
other than an ineffectual motion in limine, to identify the extent of 
the tainted identifications or to expressly exclude by name the 
witnesses present at the Preliminary Hearing. See R. 486-87, Motion 
In Limine. Neither the Motion nor the in-chambers conference between 
the trial court and counsel concerning the Motion included any 
discussion about which witnesses, if not all, that were present at 
the Preliminary Hearing or the legal effects of the eyewitnesses 
having viewed the accused under the highly suggestive circumstances 
that they did. In fact, at the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing, trial 
counsel was unable to articulate the identity of the eyewitnesses 
present at the Preliminary Hearing even though he was well-aware that 
the eyewitnesses had viewed Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant at the 
Preliminary Hearing as the accused robbers in custody, wearing 
handcuffs and jail clothing. See id. at R. 85, lines 19-21; see also 
R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 21.4 
In sum, under the facts in the instant case, there exists a lack 
of any conceivable tactical basis for appointed trial counsel's 
actions or lack thereof. See State v. Bryant, 965 P. 2d 539, 542 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 
4The prejudice to Mr. Hollen by the tainted eyewitness testimony 
is further underscored by the fact that, prior to the preliminary 
hearing, the eyewitnesses never had the opportunity to view Mr. 
Hollen or his co-defendant in person or by way of a live line-up. 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)) . Appointed trial counsel consequently rendered 
objectively deficient performance by failing to require the trial 
court to analyze and make a preliminary determination as to the 
constitutional reliability and admissibility of the eyewitness 
identifications. 
II. BY WAY OF THE UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION OF GUILT, 
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL BREACHED HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY 
TO MR. HOLLEN AND THEREBY DEPRIVED MR. HOLLEN OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY ADVISE MR. HOLLEN OF 
THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY. 
In its brief, the State argues that counsel's concurrence with 
Mr. Hollen's decision not to testify at trial did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 19-24. 
Besides the essential failure to address the merits of Mr. Hollen's 
arguments concerning the breach of the duty of loyalty set out in the 
Brief of Appellant, the State fails to recognize, and thereby 
acknowledges, that Mr. Hollen could not and did not make an informed 
decision concerning the right to testify because he had not been 
adequately advised about the consequences of exercising the right to 
testify. See R. 516-18, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of 
Fact, Nos. 37-40 (finding that appointed trial counsel "spent little 
time discussing Mr. Hollen's right to testify with him"). 
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The trial court's own Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of 
Fact demonstrate that appointed trial counsel, based on his 
unsubstantiated opinion that Mr. Hollen was guilty, constructively, 
if not actually, denied Mr. Hollen of the effective assistance of 
counsel and breached his duty of loyalty to Mr. Hollen as his client. 
See id. at R. 517-18, No. 40. Rather than basing his legal advice 
not to testify on a well-reasoned analysis of Utah case law 
concerning the likely consequences of Mr. Hollen's testimony if he 
were to testify, appointed trial counsel simply failed to zealously 
pursue the interests of Mr. Hollen in the course of advising him not 
to testify. See R. 521, Transcript on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary 
Hearing), p. 69, lines 3-12.5 With little of no advice concerning the 
constitutional right to testify and the specific benefits and 
disadvantages of testifying at trial, appointed trial counsel assumed 
Mr. Hollen's guilt and then utilized his unwarranted assumption as 
the basis for advising Mr. Hollen to waive his constitutional right 
to testify. Cf. Rule 1.2(a), Rules of Professional Conduct (stating 
that "[i]n a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to . . . whether the 
client will testify") (Emphasis added). 
5By arguing that Mr. Hollen's testimony would not have altered 
the outcome of the trial, the State not only gives short shrift to 
the previously discussed unreliability of the eyewitness 
identifications but it underestimates the value of a defendant 
looking the jurors squarely in the eye and testifying that he or she 
did not commit the crime. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as the Brief of Appellant 
previously filed with this Court, Mr. Hollen respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse his convictions of Aggravated Robbery and 
Aggravated Kidnaping and for such other relief as the Court deems 
just and appropriate under the circumstances presented in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25 day of February, 2000. 
ARNOLD f&sWIGGINS , P . C . 
'1tfigg\ms 
Attorneys^air Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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